Best banking choices for students

Best banking choices for students Important facts for students to select a bank Nowadays it is so great that we have such diverse choice of banks. The banking system and variety of options offer students a lot of possibilities that provide financial freedom. But the questions of that sort should be treated very carefully, since only one wrong step can result in big debts or higher interests. While making choice, one should work out his/her own strategy and think over what bank and what exactly options required. Of course, there are a lot of bank institutions, but you should identify those, which have the most favorable offers for you as a student. They have different options for various targeted groups, filtrate carefully those, which can be of your concern. Short term overdrafts to pay for your custom essays or long term cooperation with setting up a deposit account: decide what you need. We provide for you some other factors you should take into account, before getting involved into financial cooperation. Consider suggestions and free options carefully Attracted by favorable free options of some banks? Of course, they know what they are doing. But do not get trapped! Free short lasting suggestions soon end and you can be faced with less profitable variants of financial service. Thus, having made certain sum of money, you can be looking for the suitable circumstances of saving account opening. Do not forget to monitor the interest rate you will earn within certain period at several banking houses and select that one, which will bring you the biggest profit. Do not fall for free MP3 downloads or few-days free Wi-Fi options if you lose in the interest rate. That is not worth it. Overdraft: amount, limit and interest. Most likely reason people partner with bank is for sure overdraft. Find out what is the maximally possible amount of overdraft, which you can receive as a student. Also ask about the necessity of exceeding limit and the interest it results in. Discover all details and consider all facts. Thus, there are a lot of banks, which offer interest-free overdrafts for students for couple of years and it is really great opportunity for you. One more thing you should bear in mind is that banks will not certainly provide you with the maximal announced sum of the overdraft. Most often it is available only for students of the final year, who have eligible credit rating. So if they say that the maximal possible overdraft is up to  £2,000, there is no guarantee that you will obtain this sum. The repayment procedure It is great if you manage to return the overdraft in time within the interest-free period. But the time spins away and one day you can discover that you are obliged to pay interest charges. That is why before taking overdraft consider all details of the repayment procedure. You should know the exact date when you should return the money and confirm if it should be during the university studies or is supposed to be after graduation. Find out all the details for all the possible scenarios of this financial situation, so that you can be sure that you will be in an advantageous position in any case. Gain the credit rating Starting with small overdrafts, step by step you develop and elaborate your relationships with bank. Such kinds of relationships and partnering result in credit rating. Credit rating is an estimate of your income, borrowed amount and spending history. It is a score, which you receive from bank from the point of view of risk and your financial eligibility. Having trustworthy credit rating you can receive the bigger overdraft amount or gain other favorable options. Think, learn and make your choice being very attentive or even pedantic. We know that this is not much likely for students to give much attention to such boring questions, but the financial concerns are those which definitely should not be neglected.

Vestal livery Essays

Vestal livery Essays Vestal livery Paper Vestal livery Paper The scene is set in a small garden, with a few bushes and perhaps a fountain. There is a house, of which one of the windows is Juliets, but there is no balcony. It is quite minimalist, though there are some plants, but only one window, with a muslin curtain which flutters in the wind as the window is open. Romeo appears, dressed on the same clothes as he wore at the party, but without the mask. He wears a sword and a feathered hat. He appears to have been drinking alcohol and so is slightly intoxicated. But this is only shows through his slightly slurred speech and unbalanced walk. He walks around, up and down and in circle as if very agitated. And then starts to talk (he jests. wound), still unaware of the window, and is walking around, kicking at the pebbles and dirt on the floor. A flickering light then appears at Juliets window, and Romeo stumbles away from it shielding his eyes (even though it is not very bright we can attribute this to his tipsiness) puts his hand to his sword as if expecting to have to draw it quickly, for a fight, and hides behind a bush, although it does not offer much cover. He first seems worried and angry, and speaks quickly (but softbreaks) but then as he realises it is Juliets room his face relaxes and his speech slows. He points at the window as he says arrive fair sun gently and tenderly, but then speaking quite aggressively and he contorts his face as he makes a violent gesture at the moon. He spits out the words sick and pale with disgust, but then looks back up at Juliets window, and says that thou.. than she whilst he stumbles out from the bush and cranes his neck to get a glimpse of Juliet, whilst running to his next bush as a hiding place. He sits here and completes his speech, pointing to his own clothes when he talks of vestal livery. Juliet then appears in her nightdress and is brushing her hair, which is wet, and is the reason she wet outside, to dry it, is unaware of Romeo walking around bellow her. All is silent for a few moments as Romeo does not realise she is there, he walks around kicking up the dirt and stones, until he looks up and notices Juliet, he then silently hides behind a bush. He then starts to whisper silently to himself (it is my lady. that cheek), stealing furtive glances towards her, several times making out as if to jump out from behind the bush and talk to her. He slowly gets loader as he talks and getting faster until he suddenly realises he is talking too loud and quietens at the brightness of her cheek . He says it is my lady as if he is convincing himself, as she is not truly his lady yet, with a pause between the two sections of the phrase. He is sad when he whispers o that were! and slows down. He makes as if to get up and call out to her when he says I will answer it, but then he pauses and stops and chides himself, settling back down. He speaks enviously of the two stars which trap Juliets attention, waving his hands around, pointing at the particular two. He gets more passionate till he reaches the volume climax what if her her head? Then he realises he is two loud and may draw attention to himself so he suddenly become more quiet. He faces upwards and makes dramatic hand movements as he talks of the sky would through the airy. Not night. He then turns back to Juliet as she leans over, and looks at his own hand as he says see how her hand. Juliet meanwhile is still brushing her hair (for it is quite long), and then starts to stare at the moon. After Romeo finishes talking Juliet sighs and says the words (ay me), and leans out the window staring at the moon wistfully. Romeo stays behind the bush, now staring at Juliet and whispers passionately to himself she speaks and waits hopefully for her to carry on, stepping out from his bush, to hide in another with a better view. Juliet here goes in and appears at another window, when she appears again; Romeo begins to speak fervently, rashly and quickly. He slows down when he says as a winged messenger for thou art, and sighs with wonder, his face upturned towards Juliet. He makes large dramatic gestures with his hands, reaching up when he says over my head, and making a gesture as if to brush something away from on top of his head, and clutching the air behind him. And when he speaks of the heavens, as a winged messenger of heaven he has a wondrous upon his face and he changes the way he is sitting to be more comfortable. He looks dreamy through the continuation of this speech, talking of things wondrous and his eyes are constantly upturned or upon Juliet. He only awakens from tis dream when Juliet speaks, here he jumps at the sound, having been lost in his own world. Juliet is now starting to talk (o Romeo Capulet), louder than Romeo, unaware of anyone elses presence, staring dreamily from her window, looking up to the moon. Romeo then is about to jump out and talk to her, but stops and whispers (shall at this), looking worried and undecided.. Juliet carries on talking ( tis all myself)but now more purposely, and perhaps slightly angrily, using more hand movements, but still looking upwards, and so does not notice Romeo. Romeo finally decides to jump out and calls up to her in a strong and wilful voice yet still passionate, with a hint of distrust and worry.

Health Care Reform Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Health Care Reform - Essay Example This took place after fruitless attempts by several Democratic presidents for decades, which made the moment very significant in the long legislative contest.  This Health Care Reform legislation is expected to cover around thirty million Americans who do not have access to it. It requires Americans to make sure that they have health insurance cover and for low and middle-income persons, it would subsidize private coverage. Furthermore, it would include approximately sixteen million more Americans to the Medicaid rolls. As Wolfe (2010) notes, the Health care Reform legislation is of great significant to children and young adults, as regards to health care access and cover. To start with, beginning 2010, new private plans must offer preventive care free of charge. It does not permit them to charge deductibles or co-payments for preventive services. This is also the case for Medicare starting from 1 January 2011. It therefore places more children at an advantage of getting access to well-child health checks for earlier detection of potential health problems.

Do Institutions matter Essay Example | Topics and Well Written Essays - 500 words

Do Institutions matter - Essay Example The basic explanations that have been provided by economists to illustrate on how institution spurs economic growth haven’t been satisfactorily. Furthermore, the theories provided for which are made to guide on the two principles does not provide for full understanding of the variables and thus have lapses. Neither are the statistical tools for analysis in the case of time series are enough to show direct correlation between the two. Thus, this provides for inspiration or stimuli (Rodrà ­guez, 2013) for the article to provide for a broader way to view the two issues and be flexible in analysis. Institutions does not necessary lead to economic development but the latter can always be achieved in other ways. Development to a country can be stimulated through creation of wealth that expands various sectors in the economy. By doing so, we provide for expansionary measures that make the institutions better and increase growth. We do not need more mature institutions for development to occur. Such is the case in more developed nations who developed earlier without any key institutions. Even if institutions spur growth, then it cannot apply to all countries. For example, nations can always import ideas such as technology or train labor to help growth within them. Methods such as protection of properties majorly employed by the capitalists to make institutions grow are very good and can always be beneficial to nations. But the virtue will only lead to strong institutions to unique ones in the economy more so in countries where there is less government controls. The article uses questionnaires to collect data. It presents issues in form of queries that are answered by analyzing various world institutions and economic policies to generate data. This is further enhanced, by use of samples to explain on how diverse countries developed and what made their institutions stronger (Rodrà ­guez, 2013). To validate the data, it

Sovereign wealth funds. International Finance Essay

Sovereign wealth funds. International Finance - Essay Example These funds’ management is separated from official management of foreign currency reserve. The aim of SWFs among others is to manage government wealth so that funds do not remain static thus balancing investment with savings. The SWFs as a government-based investment strategy may involve the buying of shares in profit making organization or the taking over of a foreign based company, foreign direct investment, purchase of stakes in financial firms, long-term government bond amongst others. This process has resulted in a well recognized trend in monetary trade, foreign currency policy, and new international finance strategies. But, much debate subsists on the legitimacy of these policies and their ethical parameters. There are considerable economic and social issues associated to fairness of competition and possible political non-commercial hidden agenda, which come to the surface seriously. Various institutions are starting to feel greatly concerned by the issue of SWFs especi ally because these investments are taking considerable proportions. While many countries are facing important turnabouts and recession in their economy others are continuously sustaining their considerable economic rise. Some major states are facing recurrent financial crises due to external parameters which are out of their control for instance the oil crisis, financial globalization which results in accumulation of wealth in term of foreign currencies and financial asset by some countries. While there was the 800 billion U.S dollars deficit in 1996 in the United State’s current account, export-oriented economies of South East Asian countries were enjoying incessant growth. It is universally recognized thus, that the subsequent rise in SWFs is a result of large global macroeconomic impairment and imbalances. These major discrepancies have resulted in some countries possessing high relative ratio of foreign currency reserve which has boosted considerably the event sovereign wealth

Improving Pay for Performance with SOP

Improving Pay for Performance with SOP INTRODUCTION: Executive pay has been a big controversial issue over the past twenty years due to various governance failures which have generated a forceful policy debate on the appropriate role of shareholder voice in corporate governance (e.g., Bebchuk 2007; Bainbridge 2006). Some say the pay is too high and is set by captured boards while some say it reflects the marketplace in action. Therefore, some companies are either willing to or mandated to give shareholders an advisory vote on the prior years compensation of top executives-a say on pay (SOP). SOP is a term used for a rule in corporate governance whereby stakeholders are given the opportunity to vote on the enumeration of executives. SOP potentially not only gives shareholders an advisory vote on pay practices, but also increases scrutiny from shareholders over top managements compensation at most companies. Therefore, this study illustrates how SOP improves pay for performance. Under certain circumstances, this study will show that pay for performance has been increasing significantly after the adoption of SOP. When further decomposing executive pay into its cash-based and equity-based components, this study finds evidence of an increase at most companies in the relationship between performance and these compensation components, and the potential to enhance transparency, governance, and accountability, which, in turn, should lead to greater efficiency and social responsiveness (Bebchuk, Friedman, and Friedman, 2007). MAIN: This study is going to discuss further about the principal of SOP and its effect on pay for performance in firms and the related principal-agency problems in corporate governance. SOP might have not been a new concept in corporate governance in the UK, but some firms in developed and developing countries have been implementing this concept over these years around the world. SOP is known as one of the recent phenomenon of shareholder activism, a voice mechanism for shareholders (Hirschman, 1970). It is the effectuation of providing shareholders the right to vote on executive compensation program at the annual meeting. The regulation changes a variety of attitudes toward corporate governance and disclosure habitudes of all public companies. This concept allows shareholders to either raise their voices or express their opinions against executive compensation programs. In other words, instead of letting top executives to decide the level of compensation plans, shareholders can use their voting rights to either approve or give advice on executive compensation plans that link to top executives performance. To clearly justify, SOP is seen as a friendly tool to express, improve the dissent, giving advice on remuneration, but not an aggressive governance rule to destroy firm value or dissociate the relationship between principal and agent. While companies are not bound by SOP advisory votes, the act not only requires firms to disclose the vote results after the shareholders meeting, but also report whether and how the board considers the voting results in the following year. Consistent with this argument, De Franco, Hope and Larocque (2013) find that additional disclosures improves board effectiveness at monitoring executive c ompensation and in strengthening the link between pay and performance. SOP was used formally in UK in 2003, but in fact it was unofficially started and practiced in July 1999 as non-binding vote on executive compensation or remuneration. In the early of 2001, there are various companies beginning to propose the remuneration committee report, and there is an evidence that the number of firms submitting the proposal grew rapidly in 2002. After the UK, several EU countries consequently adopted this principle such as Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, then it spreaded to Australia and USA. It has been lasting for nearly 15 years in the UK while in the USA, this concept started in 2010 and became compulsory in the same year, which is relatively brief and the current knowledge of SOPs results and effects are still limited along with many academic discussion and practices. Basically, the objectives and models of SOP vary considerably across the world. Under Dodd-Frank, SOP in the USA requires companies to hold a non-binding vote on compensation at least once every three years. Afterwards, firms are also required to request shareholders to regulate the frequency of future say on pay votes at least once every six years but no less than that, also the shareholders are given the option of doing annually or every two or three years. However, in the UK, the government presented the Directors Remuneration report to record for a shareholders vote on current level of compensation at every annual general meeting. Pay for performance is currently a big issue in corporate governance due to several executive compensation scandals. Additionally, House Report 110088 noted that the average of a CEO in a top company earned approximately 140 times higher than the pay of a regular employee in 1991; nonetheless, this ratio increased exponentially to about 500 to 1 in 2003. The compensation for CEOs is divided into 2 parts which are fixed compensation such as cash and bonuses, and variable compensation ,also called performance-based compensation. The variable compensation which strongly relates to CEOs performance, including option grants, stocks option,.etc will be determined comprehensively in this study so as to favour the practical impact of SOP. Refer to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the traditional principal-agent theories stated that the owner of the firm constructed the compensation contracts to the agent in terms of maximizing the value of the firm. Muller-Kahle (2013) finds some evidence that, w hen CEOs have a dominant ownership stake, firm monitoring is diminished and firm performance suffers. However, most of public companies generates it infeasible for shareholders to debate the managerial compensation. In the phenomenon, the executive compensation scandals occurred frequently and severally than we could imagine. For examples, Tyco International was reported a CEOs scandal in 2005, its CEO Dennis Kozlowski and CFO Mark H. Swartz were convicted of stealing $600 million, these money was symbolized as the excess of executive remuneration, i.e. Kozlowski gave his wife $2 million birthday gift on Islands Mediterranean at companys expense. From our point of view, if Say on Pay was introduced and implemented earlier, those compensation scandals would had possibly not happened and also its reasonable to achieve and practice the SOP policy at the moment. According to Vicente Cuà ±at, Mireia Gine, and Maria Guadalupe (2013), the main purposes of Say on Pay is to raising shareholders voices, concentrating on the shareholders interests but also focusing on values that CEOs added to the firm and the transparency of CEOs interests. It leads to the improvement of the agency problem. Although a variety of evidence are against the benefits of Say on Pay, Bebchuk (2007) contended that a formalized say on pay vote is able to overcome the psychological barriers and support the negotiation of better compensation contracts. Indeed, many articles suggest that the approach of SOP does have a positive correlation between both firms value and the issue of pay for performance. We believe that there is nothing 100% right or wrong in all circumstances and its inherently difficult to determine precisely influences of any corporate governance regulation. Hence, the objective of this paper is to approve the improvements of Say on Pay on pay for performance in corporations in terms of increasing firms values, shareholders values, reducing agency problems and enhancing the transparency of executive compensation under certain conditions. First condition is firms with excessive or ineffectiveness CEO remuneration, as stated by Core at el. (1999), less effective boards are regularly related to high abnormal CEO compensation and low sensitivity pay for performance, which means that SOP is likely to benefit to the firm with weaker corporate governance and incompetent remuneration design. Secondly, firms with independent-minded shareholders willing to vote against management are likely to face more pressure if the say on pay is achieved; thirdly, firms are willing to b oost performance, enhance compensation and reform as a consequence of shareholder pressure. Due to Baird and Stowasser (2002), the first benefit of implementing SOP is certainly promoting accountability and transparency in the compensation report. To earn stakeholders support or prevent litigation, boards not only have sought to enhance disclosures concerning executive compensation plans but also publish an annual directors remuneration report over the past year, which causes directors more carefully to consider shareholder interests when designing executive pay plans. The recent trend confirmed the increased directors accountability after the introduction of say on pay (Cai et al. 2007, 2009; Del Guercio et al. 2008). As found in the previous articles, Davis (2007) stated that the Say on Pay proposal did associate smoothly with the communication and relationship between shareholders and board of directors. Refer to the UK evidences, after annual general meeting and the accurately analysis of remuneration report, there is a substantially development in the connection and tr ansmission between compensation committees and shareholders. Firms are more opened to a dialogue with shareholders to justify a broader compensation decisions and practices. Companies will not only have the opportunity to include additional resolutions on specific compensation decisions, but also have the opportunity to ask shareholders views on specific compensation decisions, including decisions related to various aspects or categories of pay. Each company, however, will be required to permit shareholders to vote on a resolution addressing all of the compensation disclosed in the annual proxy. This finding may advance scrutiny and also lead to more informed voting decision and the acceptance of a remarkable premium. Also, Deane (2007) and Davis (2007) suggested that SOP probably superior adjusts for principal-agent interests and enhance corporate governance and performance. The SOP allows shareholder to raise their voices in executive which definitely better align with CEO and shareholders interests, consequently, it comes up with the reduction of agency cost and a more adequately compensation contracts. Due to Peter Iliev and Svetla Vitanova (2015), the market reacted positively to the practices of Say on pay votes and the general supports of directors from shareholders are spotted to be increased. In practices in the UK, the impact of SOP was found to be positive as well, Fabrizio and David A. Maber (2013) analysed that the adoption and implementation of say on pay to the UK regulation was escorted with positive stock price reactions at firms with high dissent compensation conflicts and particularly practices diluting punishment for poor performance. By the same token, enforcing SOP may potentially increase Earnings per shares (EPSs), Return on assets (ROA) and Return on equity (ROE), the appliance also gains profitability and efficiency, higher growth in labour yield and constructive effect on accounting statement in the following years after the binding vote. As a result of Vicente Cuà ±at, Mireia Gine, and Maria Guadalupe (2013), the shareholder value increased by 5.4 percent after Say on Pay implementation, this such high market gains were explained by the improvement of CEOs performance under shareholder pressure and the effect of better alignment of pay for performance and also the reduction of pay for failure. Those evidences are consistent with the aims of this study that say on pay is used as a value-creating governance mechanism to contribute value to firm and shareholders. According to Stephen Davis Millstein Center Fellow (2007), advisory Say on Pay votes are extensively seen as having been an influential committing factor in taming the rate of increase, reduce controversial compensation of CEO, pressure firm to increase sensitivity between compensation and performance curbing opportunities for reward for failure and tying compensation dramatically closer to performance. As we mentioned above, not every firms reported the same results on the impact of SOP. However, we do find the strong positive influence in the firm with high dissent between shareholders and directors and the firm with excessive CEOs compensation based on the managerial power viewpoint (Bertrand (2009), Frydman and Jenter (2010), Murphy (2013). As documented by Fabrizio and David A. Maber (2013), their tests were coherent with Core et al(1999) s research that the introduction of SOP was followed by positive stock price reaction, especially in the firms with controversial compensation report and those which abate penalties for poor performance. Correa and Lel (2013) also recorded a numerical decrease in CEO pay of 6.1% after implementation of Say-on-Pay regulation in a sample of countries. Moreover, by using regression analysis on large sample of UK firms, Fabrizio and David (2013) tested on some vital elements in CEO pays including bonuses, equity awards to evaluate whether the sensitivity of CEO compensation is highly adequated to performance along with economics factors before and after the regulation. In general, they concluded that even though others economic elements persist unchanged, there is still a significant rise in the sensitivity of CEO pay to poor performance in less observable elements of pay. Moreover, this finding is consistent with the result of Ertimur, Muslu, and Ferri (2011) which is the most pronounced in high dissent firms and firms maintaining excessive executive compensation before SOP, means that SOP policy does reduce the excessive performanced-base salary to create value and link the remuneration more dramatically to the performance. Various companies either removed or altered provisions that investors considered as rewards for failure such as generous severance contracts and low performance hurdles, often in response to institutional investors explicit requests. Fabrizio and David A. Maber (2013) examined this issue on high dissent(HD) firm (with 20% dissent vote) and low dissent(LD) firm (with less than 5% dissent vote) before and after the vote , the result showed that the high dissent firms reducing the notice periods of severance contracts after the first vote (80%) are likely to be higher than before the vote (20%) and also substantially higher than the low dissent firms (33.3%). Therefore, this figures suggested that say on pay is the reason of reduction of controversial compensation, besides, 70% of low dissent firms scaling down the notice period before the vote which is the evidence of elimination of dissension between shareholders and executives. Moreover, a variety of firms established a formal proces s for proactive consultation with their major shareholders going forward (Ferri and Maber, 2011). As a result, the threat of a vote was effective in inducing firms to revise CEO pay practices ahead of the annual meeting and decreasing the situation of pay for failures and the growth rate of pay. Meanwhile, they also analysed the second most influenced remuneration item which is performance-based vesting conditions in equity grants. During the following years that performance targets are not accomplished, this retesting provision is seemed to contribute for reexamining and subsequently assists for the potential pay for failure. After the research, they concluded that before the first vote, HD firms and LD firms achieved 5% and 25% respectively to reduce or remove this issue. Nonetheless, the result changed significantly after the SOP vote, HD firms agreed to shorten or abolish retesting provision with statistically 76.3%, while the LD gained 28%. Generally, several evidences support that these contractual modification are the direct repercussion of SOP regulation. Base on the top 100 companies 2016 surveys in the US, SOP is raising shareholders voices and putting more pressure on CEO in order to perform better, however, we found that shareholder doesnt empower themselves to manipulate the CEOs compensation. In fact, the number of companies adopting this policy is increasing, in 2016 there are 95 over top 100 US companies holding say on pay vote in 2016, 94 out of 95 firms held approval say-on-pay votes which is higher than 2015 and only 1 firm didnt approve which also failed in both 2014 and 2015. As being reported, 41 corporations reviewed and elected not to significantly change the compensation report, while 20 noted modification into the remuneration in response to the vote. In table 4, the Say on Pay approval rate in 2016 is relatively high with 78% receiving approval rates in excess of 90% and only 6% for-voting below 70%. This figures coordinate with data in the last 2 years 2014 and 2015, which the approval rates are comparably high. Th is finding suggests that the even shareholders have more control power in the firm, they are not likely to destroy the value or raise the unfairness and dissension through the firm. In contrast, they seem to use this policy as a friendly tool, not an aggressive regulation, to raise their voice and cut down excessive expense in compensation. Furthermore, this regulation is contributing to the competitiveness of the British economy and the attraction of London as an international capital market (Stephen Davis Millstein Center Fellow,2007). The UK Department of Trade and Industry confirmed that the votes lead to a better planning by corporations, fewer surprises, better dialogue with shareholders, and apparently, it can reduce downside risks and big scandals among quoted companies in recent years. Due to London Stock Exchange, by involving Say on Pay voting rights, London will possibly be equipped with a more competitive border in order to attract capital, comparing to New York. Last but not least, while companies are not bound by SOP advisory votes, it requires companies to disclose the vote results after the shareholders meeting. In addition, firms must report whether and how the board considers the voting results in the following year. Ferri and Maber (2013) study the market reaction in 2002 to SOP that mandates non-binding but advisory vote on the compensation report and find that firms with high dissent alter the compensation composition, thereby improving pay for performance. Moreover, in a sample of the largest UK companies from 2002 to 2006, boards reduced excess salary as well as the dilutive effect of stock option grants in response to past negative non-binding votes (Carter and Zamora,2009). Consequently, shareholders right of non-binding votes could provide a useful mechanism that addresses the potential problem of incomplete firms management, suggesting that monitoring and reward mechanism dynamics can effectively coexist between owners and firm managers, thereby improving corporate governance (Kimbro and Xu, 2016). Conclusion To conclude, we investigate the impact of the right of shareholders non-binding but advisory votes on say-on-pay. We find evidence that firms either modified or altered their compensation structures in order to win shareholders positive votes. CEOs compensation decreases in most firms while larger decreases are found in firms that overpaid their CEOs in the previous year. Similarly, affected firms linked their pay mix to more close for performance. In terms of voting itself, shareholders are not more likely to vote for executive compensation when the firm pays excessive pay for top management, or has a large increase in CEO compensation compared to previous years. Moreover, among the components of the compensation plan, shareholders are more likely to vote against the plan when they contain other compensation, such as private bonuses unrelated to performance, which have been opposed by critics of executive pay. Most importantly, SOP does not limit the level of compensation or empower shareholders to control the interests of top management. It can be seen as a friendly corporate governance tool to prevent conflicts of the issues between top management and shareholders regarding pay for performance. Additionally, this study finds that the increase in pay for performance after the implementation of SOP is larger in firms with excessive pay for CEO relative to firms with average level of pay for CEO. The evidence suggests that SOP do increase the executive compensation monitoring ability for investors who care about the long-term value of a firm but who are lack of the ability to influence executive compensation structure before SOP. By contrast to most prior studies on the impact of SOP on executive incentives and compensation, the evidence shown in this study is consistent with SOP improves rather than weakens the alignment of managerial wealth and shareholder interests in certain circumstances. References: Bainbridge S. 2006. The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights. UCLA Law Review, 53: 601-636. Bainbridge, Stephen M. The Corporate Governance Provisions of Dodd-Frank. (2010). Bainbridge, Stephen M. Is Say on PayJustified?. (2009). Baird, J. and Stowasser, P. (2002) Executive compensation disclosure requirements: The German, UK, and US approaches, PracticalLaw.com, PLC Document 4-101-7960, September 23. BBC News. 2003. Glaxo defeated by shareholders. May 19. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/3038381.stm Bebchuk, L. (2007) Written testimony submitted before the Committee on Financial Services, United States House of Representatives, Hearing on Empowering Shareholders on Executive Compensation, March 8. Bebchuk, L., Friedman, A. T., Friedman, W. J. 2007. Empowering shareholders on executive compensation: hearing on H.R. 1257 before the H. Comm. on Fin. Ser., 110th Cong. 68: Cai J. and R. Walkling. 2007. Shareholders Say on Pay: Does It Create Value?. Working Paper, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA. Cai J., J. Garner and R. Walkling. 2009. Electing Directors. Journal of Finance   forthcoming. Carter, M. E., Zamora, V. 2009. Shareholder remuneration votes and CEO compensation design, Work. Pap. Boston College. Cheffins B. and R. Thomas. 2001. Should shareholders have a greater say over executive pay? Learning from the US experience. Working Paper, Vanderbilt University Law School, Nashville, TN. Choi, S., J. Fisch and M. 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Organizational Change Essay -- Business, Interventions

Organizational change is an important part of organizational management and leaders cannot ignore the inevitability of having to manage change within their organizations. In addition, a global study that was conducted with over 2,000 organizations showed that 82 percent had implemented major information system change, which entailed other changes in structure, technology, and people as well (as cited in Robbins & Coulter, 2007). Therefore, it is imperative that managers and organizations understand how to increase their chances of having successful change programs. Diagnosis The first step in designing a change program is to understand what the problem or issue is that needs to be changed. This is referred to as diagnosis and is very important in making sure that the situation is fully understood so that an appropriate plan can be developed that will achieve the desired outcomes. In addition, diagnosis helps the organization determine what the scope of the issue is and how to make a change that will result in the desired outcome. There are several ways to receive the needed data to conduct a diagnosis. The organization can conduct attitude surveys, they can use direct observations, interview key individuals within the organization, develop workshops and review documents and records (Gibson et al., 2009). Unfortunately, many organizations do not take their time with this step which can result in flawed conclusions on the true nature of the problem, not understanding what their desired outcome from the change is, or not identifying the right intervention for the change. Therefore, it is very important to collect the needed information from various sources to determine the nature and scope of the issue or p... ...nforcement (Gibson et al., 2009). Conclusion The concept of change is relatively easy to understand, but making a change within an organization is complicated and involves numerous variables. First mangers need to use a systematic approach to determine the issues. They have to develop a course of action that resolves the issue, makes sure that everyone understands the issue, and the need for change. Mangers have to then move everyone to the new behavior using learning principles of training, demonstration, motivation, and empowerment. Finally, there must be feedback on how the change worked, make any needed adjustments, and reinforce the new behavior so old habits are eliminated. Change is an important part of all organizations and mangers that are able to develop and implement effective change programs will be valuable members of their organization.